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Military superiority depends, in part, on a 
never-ending, dogged, and relentless pursuit 
of technological advancement. In this 
pursuit, the scientific method practically dic-
tates that failures will outnumber successes. 
Undoubtedly, you are familiar with 
anecdotes of staggering investments in 
under-performing, government-driven 
research and development (R&D) initia-
tives. Today, a consistent media drumbeat 
highlights the delays, cost overruns, and 
performance concerns surrounding the joint 
strike fighter and other major systems.2 On 
closer examination, these failures often 
derive from a dysfunctional approach to 
the process of innovation rather than the 
natural effects of trial and error. Indeed, the 
defense acquisition community, saddled 
with severe post-recession fiscal constraints 
and a dysfunctional budget system, increas-
ingly appears to adopt risk-averse practices 
that stifle and undermine innovation. These 
trends are cause for concern.
The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes 
that it must do more to spur innovation.3 
Recently, Frank Kendall, under secretary of 
defense (acquisition, technology, and logistics) 
has honed his warning that DOD is under- 
investing in maintaining its technological edge: 
The rise of foreign capability, coupled with 
the overall decline in U.S. research and 
development investments, is jeopardizing 
our technological superiority.4 
In light of DOD’s interest in deploying 
procurement methods with the potential 
to harness American ingenuity and ensure 
battlefield superiority, we suggest that DOD’s 
leadership make time for David McCullough’s 
recent biography, The Wright Brothers,5 as an 
aviation anecdote chockfull of fundamental 
lessons DOD must embrace to succeed. 
McCullough is one of the nation’s most 
popular biographer historians for a reason. 
His book is an entertaining re-introduction 
to the Wright family and an informative 
examination of one of the most iconic and 
significant moments in paradigm-shifting 
innovation. In that regard, it offers an ideal 
window into the often-understated human 
aspects of the R&D process. 
Think Creatively 
to Find Creators
The Wright Brothers takes us back to a 
time when human flight, aeronautics, and 
aviation were synonymous with witchcraft 
and wizardry. Two young men imagined 
that they could achieve what conventional 
wisdom and folklore deemed impossible. 
This great American epic is a tale of modest, 
self-made bicycle mechanics, lacking college 
education,6 but emboldened by a penchant 
for bird-watching, who dared to imagine, 
design, build, test, fly, master, and market 
the world’s first lighter-than-air flying 
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[I am] concern[ed] that…[DOD]may not be pushing the state- of-the-art enough in terms of 
technical performance. This endangers 
our military technical superiority.  
—Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense 
  (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)1
Over the past few decades, 
the U.S. and our allies  
have enjoyed a military  
capability advantage over 
any potential adversary….  
It has been a good run, but 
the game isn’t one sided, 
and all military advantages 
based on technology are 
temporary. 
—Frank Kendall, 
Testimony Before the 
House Committee on 
Armed Services  
(January 28, 2015)
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machine—all without government funding. 
As DOD rethinks its approach to stimulate in-
novation, surely such an extraordinary story 
contains valuable insights. 
Embrace Prizes 
and Contests  
A repeated theme in The Wright Brothers 
is the influence of European (and later, 
American) prizes and contests intended 
to spur innovation and foster competition. 
These high-profile monetary and nonmon-
etary rewards served as a potent accelerant 
to aviation innovation early in twentieth 
century. Privately funded prize contests 
such as the 1908 Michelin Prize (won by 
Wilbur Wright) and the 1927 Ortieg Prize 
(claimed by Charles Lindbergh in the Spirit of 
St. Louis) set the stage for modern privately 
funded contests such as the 2004 Ansari 
XPrize (resulting in the public debut of then-
maverick SpaceX). 
Lucrative prizes, of course, precede human 
flight. As early as 1567, European sovereigns 
offered prizes for a solution to the vex-
ing problem of accurately determining a 
ship’s longitude at sea, culminating in the 
eponymous 1714 Longitude Prize.7 Unlike 
government contracts and grants—i.e., the 
conventional, heavily regulated, cumber-
some, scandal-laden, and oft-criticized 
vehicles they tend to replace—prizes shift 
R&D risk to the private sector and provide 
governments access to previously untapped 
innovative talent. 
Unlike traditional, bilateral R&D contracts, 
where the government chooses a single  
(or very small number of) business partner(s) 
in anticipation of performance, prizes engage 
a theoretically infinite number of contestants 
who are only rewarded if and when one or 
more contestant satisfies the contest criteria. 
Deploying an unlimited number of highly 
motivated, independent research initiatives 
increases the odds that the government will 
benefit from novel approaches. 
Contests shift the risk of failure (i.e., the 
risk that effort will be expended without 
compensation) to contestants. Rather than 
agreeing to reimburse the private sector for 
effort expended in advancing the state of 
the art, the government only pays for suc-
cess. This, in effect, harnesses the potential 
of the trial-and-error approach to innova-
tion that served the Wrights so well. The 
government is not the only benefactor of 
the prize contest arrangement—innovators 
rush to invest their resources in contests 
to claim hefty financial rewards and crave 
the priceless imprimatur that accompanies 
success. Winning a high-profile government 
contest showers publicity of the type that 
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Orville Wright, Age 34
Courtesy of: Library of Congress (LC-DIG-ppmsc-06102)
Lessons Learned From 
the Wright Brothers 
☞ Experiment with prizes 
and contests. 
☞ Look outside the inner circle 
for new ideas. 
☞ Bigger isn’t always better. 
☞ Prototyping makes sense: 
fly before you buy. 
☞ Embrace, understand, and 
reward responsible risk-taking.
☞ Innovation respects no 
geographical boundaries.
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a public relations firm might promise, but 
likely cannot deliver. 
Exploiting the renewed popularity and 
seemingly limitless potential of prizes, 
President Barack Obama formally encour-
aged federal agencies to adopt prize 
contests, and shortly thereafter, Congress 
authorized federal agencies to conduct prize 
contests.8 Despite the compelling empiri-
cal, theoretical, and anecdotal evidence in 
favor of prizes, they remain relatively novel 
among federal agencies. This is particularly 
disappointing in the aerospace arena, as an 
increasingly consolidated industrial base 
of airframe manufacturers dominate the 
industry, which potentially stifles DOD’s abil-
ity to discover the dramatic ideas that could 
animate the future of air supremacy. 
Question 
Conventionality; 
Beware 
Overreliance on 
the Inner Circle
The success of privately sponsored prize con-
tests in the aviation industry also bolsters 
the idea that breakthrough solutions are 
most likely to come from perspectives out-
side the relevant scientific discipline. In this 
respect, the Wright brothers, who transi-
tioned from printing newspapers and selling 
bicycles to unlocking the mystery of flight, 
are not alone. John Harrison, who solved 
the centuries-old problem of calculating a 
ship’s longitude at sea, was a self-taught 
clockmaker, not a navigator. Napoleon’s 
1795 Food Preservation Prize champion, 
Nicolas Appert, was a confectioner before 
he invented the modern practice of canning. 
More recently, the “Mapping Dark Matter 
Competition” was claimed by a glaciology 
PhD student who crafted an algorithm—in 
less than one week—that out-performed 
state-of-the-art solutions proposed by lead-
ing physicists.9  
In the last century, many notable advances 
in aviation navigated and survived the 
government’s highly regulated and burden-
some R&D, production, deployment, and 
foreign military sale processes. But could 
it be that the 2012 success of SpaceX’s 
Dragon—the first nongovernmental com-
mercial spacecraft to deliver cargo to (and 
return with cargo from) the International 
Space Station10—was needed to remind us 
that the Wright brothers were little-known, 
lightly regarded “outsiders”? Given the dire 
fiscal environment, increasing consolidation 
in the U.S. aerospace industry,11 and govern-
ment silos in innovation, DOD must embrace 
outsiders and jettison the biases it exhibited 
with regard to outside-of-the-box innovative 
military solutions in the early 1900s. What 
better time than today to question conven-
tional wisdom?
Bigger Isn’t 
Always Better
McCullough’s biography offers bountiful 
ammunition supporting the theory that 
off-the-radar small businesses and the 
individuals behind them may offer the most 
fruitful sources of innovation—as opposed 
to the large, sophisticated, established, and 
potentially bureaucratic corporations that 
dominate the modern aerospace industry. 
McCullough makes much of the U.S. gov-
ernment’s unwillingness to take seriously 
the bicycle-building brothers from Dayton. 
Even after the Wright brothers successfully 
demonstrated flight, the U.S. War Depart-
ment completely ignored them, preferring 
instead to sink money into “The Great Aero-
drome,” piloted by the high-profile Samuel 
Langley and underwritten by the Smith-
sonian. On July 14, 1903, on the banks of 
the Potomac River in Quantico—just days 
before the Wright brothers made their his-
toric flight at the then-remote and secluded 
Kitty Hawk—Langley’s flawed behemoth 
sank moments after it took off. Given the 
government funding and resources that 
sank with it, the contrast between the 
brothers’ success and the government’s 
failure could not be more stark: 
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Side view of glider flying as a kite near the ground, Wilbur at left and 
Orville at right, glider turned forward to right and tipped downward
Courtesy of: Library of Congress (LC-DIG-ppmsc-06102)
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[N]either [Orville nor Wilbur] ever said the 
stunning contrast between their success 
and Samuel Langley’s full-scale failure just 
days before made what they had done on 
their own all the more remarkable…. [T]he 
Langley project had cost nearly $70,000, the 
greater part of it public money, whereas the 
brothers’ total expenses for everything from 
1900 to 1903, including materials and travel 
to and from Kitty Hawk, came to a little less 
than $1,000, a sum paid entirely from the 
modest profits of their bicycle business.12  
Governments tend toward this kind of behav-
ior. In his compelling history of the Predator 
drone, Richard Whittle chronicled the quest 
of Abraham (Abe) Karem, a Baghdad-born Is-
raeli engineer whose inability to thrive within 
the bureaucracies of the Israeli Air Force and 
Israel aerospace industries led to his emigra-
tion to the United States.13 Like the Wright 
brothers, whose creative genius flourished 
in the family bicycle store and on windswept 
beaches, Karem’s vision for remotely-con-
trolled flight was conceived outside of the 
established domestic industrial base.
With so much time and attention focused 
on the joint strike fighter, next-generation 
long range strike bomber, and other increas-
ingly dominant, all-encompassing weapons 
systems,14 we fear DOD reverting to the 
instincts that drew it to the attractive but 
ultimately ineffective Great Aerodrome. One 
wonders what revolutionary innovations by 
modern-day Wright brothers the Pentagon 
may have ignored. Can the United States 
avoid missing out on—and instead spur—in-
novation in its own back yard? While we 
believe that prize contests may attract 
new ideas, we also believe that jettisoning 
fixed-price R&D contracts—which prioritize 
arbitrary budgets over proven performance—
and investing in competitive prototypes 
would pay exponential dividends.  
The Power of 
Prototyping: Fly 
Before You Buy  
A century ago, the government customers 
featured in The Wright Brothers understood 
a fundamental, simple, and commonsense 
acquisition proposition: “Don’t buy it until 
you fly it.” Unfortunately, this basic com-
mercial purchasing principle was lost some-
where during the 20th century transition 
from the War Department to the leviathan, 
process-oriented, congressionally microman-
aged, and budget-challenged DOD. 
Prototyping is neither novel nor revolution-
ary; indeed, longstanding defense and feder-
al acquisition policy favors such a systematic 
approach.15 Delaying production commit-
ments until after concept demonstration 
and validation increases the government’s 
up-front R&D investment in the pursuit of 
confirming operability and ensuring long-
term return on investment. Unfortunately, 
DOD has eschewed flying prototypes—let 
alone competitive prototypes—for the KC-X 
(the in-flight refueling tanker, even though 
the procurement was billed as a commercial 
acquisition) and, more recently, the next-
generation long range strike bomber.16
DOD—and Congress, the media, and the pub-
lic—is increasingly critical of dramatic cost 
overruns, an entirely predictable outcome 
when the government commits to unproven 
technological solutions for which estimat-
ing production costs is obviously premature. 
If the government wants to know—rather 
than guess—what a major defense program 
will cost, and, more important, what value 
that program will provide, it must collect 
data through operational testing before the 
R&D process transitions to full production. 
Customers lack the critical information nec-
essary to grasp how expensive, reliable, and 
capable an airframe is until they fly it—and 
maybe even crash it. Instead of awarding 
large-scale, generation-spanning produc-
tion contracts based upon promises made 
before the development and testing cycle is 
complete, the government should consider 
and vigorously test alternative approaches 
until a proven platform emerges.  
A prudent long-term investment approach 
would pay multiple competitors to develop, 
field, and test a prototype. End-users and 
stakeholders—including pilots, missile 
and munitions teams, mechanics, wing 
commanders, strategists, and, yes, accoun-
tants—could form a better idea of what the 
actual functionality, customer satisfaction, 
and programmatic cost might be before the 
government chose its long-term business 
partner. Experience confirms that fielding a 
weapon system—and actually using it—is a 
very different experience from reading (or 
dreaming) about it.
A valuable spillover of prototyping is the 
potential for a more robust and accurate 
projection of a program’s life cycle cost,17 
rather than exclusive—and naïve—reliance 
on purchase price. Life cycle cost takes into 
account the total cost to purchase, field, 
deploy, arm, maintain, improve, sustain, 
and ultimately retire a weapon system. In 
other words, life cycle cost reflects what the 
government actually pays for the perfor-
mance it receives. 
DOD understands that the cost of building 
and flying prototypes is fully justified in 
order to save money (not to mention save 
lives and ensure battlefield superiority) over 
the several decades that airframes stay 
in service. Sadly, DOD currently lacks the 
stomach to confront—and Congress lacks 
the sophistication to grasp—the neces-
sity of making short-term investments to 
achieve long-terms savings. In the modern 
era of short-sighted, budget-driven decision-
making,18 DOD could be forgiven were the 
stakes not so high. 
Risk: Not Just 
Cost Overruns 
and Delays 
Innovation entails risk, and the Wright 
brothers remind us that risk involves 
matters more significant than cost over-
runs, schedule slippage, or degradation of 
aspirational performance specifications. 
Every time the brothers tested their flying 
machine, they risked their lives.
Early on, the brothers decided never to fly 
together. If one brother died, the other 
could continue their quest. The brothers 
understood the necessity of risk-taking, and 
their willingness to assume the ultimate 
risk set them apart from leading figures in 
aviation theory—most of whom never at-
tempted flight. 
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Flying machines crash, and (test) pilots and 
their passengers do not always survive.19 
Orville nearly died in the Fort Myer crash 
that claimed the life of Army Lieutenant 
Thomas Selfridge.20
In recounting Wilbur Wright’s first public 
speech on flight, later dubbed “The Book 
of Genesis of the twentieth-century Bible 
of Aeronautics,” McCullough described the 
Wright Brothers’ risk calculus: 
What was needed…for success with a fly-
ing machine…was the ability to ride with 
the wind, to balance and steer in the air. 
[Rather than]…explain how a bird could 
soar through the air[,]…he took a sheet of 
paper, and…let it drop. It would not “settle 
steadily down as a staid, sensible piece of 
paper ought to do, but it insists on contra-
vening every recognized rule of decorum, 
turning over and darting hither and thither 
in the most erratic manner, much after 
the style of an untrained horse.” This was 
the kind of horse, he said, that men had to 
learn to manage in order to fly, and there 
were two ways: “One is to get on him and 
learn by actual practice how each motion 
and trick may be best met; the other is to 
sit on a fence and watch the beast a while, 
and then retire to the house and at leisure 
figure out the best way of overcoming his 
jumps and kicks. The latter system is the 
safest, but the former, on the whole, turns 
out the larger proportion of good riders.”21 
The Wright brothers’ courage and example 
resonates today. Frank Kendall bemoaned that, 
in a challenging environment dominated by 
tight budgets and an emphasis on compliance: 
[DOD] may not be pushing the state-
of-the-art enough in terms of technical 
performance…. Simply delivering what was 
initially required on cost and schedule can 
lead to failure in achieving our evolving na-
tional security mission—the reason defense 
acquisition exists in the first place….22 
The potential cost of systemic risk aversion—
conservative unwillingness to take risks and 
fail—does not bode well for DOD’s ability to 
sustain technological battlespace superiority.
The Wright brothers willingly assumed great 
risk in the name of technological prog-
ress, but they took that risk on their own 
terms. The brothers never rushed laborious 
pre-flight inspections, and wind conditions 
frequently prompted cancellations. Despite 
enormous pressure, Orville and Wilbur 
understood that—to properly mitigate 
risk—they must sometimes disappoint 
thousands of spectators, including hundreds 
of congressman, senators, military officers, 
and potential customers.23 
Innovation 
Respects No 
Geographical 
Boundaries
America’s hubris with regard to its techni-
cal superiority and its historical status as 
a unique incubator for creative, innovative, 
and entrepreneurial endeavor must be 
critically reexamined. Innovation, and, more 
broadly, intellectual capital, respects no 
geographical boundaries. Any technologi-
cal advantage the United States may have 
historically enjoyed is rapidly eroding:
[U.S.] government policies no longer shape 
industry environment as much as they did 
in the past…. As long as the nation’s pre-
dominance in the global advanced technol-
ogy sector is under relative erosion, the U.S. 
will no longer be able [to] dominate entire 
global value chains…. When U.S.-based 
companies do dominate critical value ac-
tivities, the latter tend to rely on strategic 
alliances with foreign corporations.24 
In other words, innovation cannot be 
perceived as a domestic sport over which 
Americans enjoy a natural monopoly. Global-
ization—and competition from abroad—can-
not be ignored.
Even though it played out in a far more insu-
lar and dramatically less globalized commu-
nity, one of the most remarkable aspects of 
the Wright Brothers’ story was their success 
despite the U.S. government’s utter and com-
plete disregard for their endeavors. Instead of 
investigating and incubating this transforma-
tive technology that would forever change 
the nature of warfare and civilian travel, the 
United States rebuffed the Wright Brothers 
and turned a blind eye until their machine—
and the skills necessary to harness it—were 
publicly demonstrated, celebrated, taught, 
and sold—in Europe. 
After their success at Kitty Hawk, the broth-
ers’ sense of patriotic duty outweighed any 
sting of rejection, such that they gave their 
country one last chance before taking their 
wares to Europe.25 Their persistence proved 
fruitless. Despite their description of their 
successful 1904 trial flights, and the fact 
that the Wrights made no appeal for finan-
cial support, the War Department answered 
with a boilerplate rejection letter.26  
When Wilber Wright arrived in Europe 
shortly thereafter, he was warmly wel-
comed and celebrated. (Fortunately, for 
the Wrights and the aviation industry, this 
was a time before export controls may 
have made such an excursion impossible.27) 
Wilbur flew hundreds of public demonstra-
tions in several countries, enthusiastically 
attended by military and public officials, 
celebrities, royalty, and throngs of people 
that traversed Europe chasing rumors that 
Wilbur Wright would make their wildest 
dreams come true. The French benefitted 
the most from this cultural exchange. The 
French pilots Wilbur Wright trained almost 
immediately began challenging the Wrights 
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“Innovation… 
increasingly…
comes from the 
commercial  
sector and 
from overseas.”
—“Better Buying Power  
Fact Sheet” (April 9, 2015)
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as record-setting aviators using the Wright 
machines and—leading up to World War I—
the French aviation industry blossomed.  
By the time the Wright brothers signed their 
first contract with the U.S. War Department, 
worth $25,000,28 the brothers had received 
$35,000 from French Syndicate payments, 
prize money, and cash awards, not including 
the contract signed with the French govern-
ment. In total, their exploits in Europe re-
sulted in over $300,000 in contracts and prizes.
No U.S. government funding, policy, or 
initiative contributed to the Wright brothers 
embarking upon their ambitious quest. Nor 
did government efforts to nurture a nascent 
industry propel them past any significant 
hurdle. Ultimately, the U.S. government 
consistently failed to invest in, let alone 
sustain, accelerate, or foster their efforts. 
Conversely, European enthusiasm—backed 
by generous private and public fund-
ing—empowered the rapid evolution of the 
burgeoning aviation industry.
In an increasingly globalized technological 
environment, DOD must reimagine its rela-
tionship with its allies in the pursuit of tech-
nological superiority. Among other things, 
DOD needs to build bridges with its allies to 
foster and incentivize collaborative R&D.
Conclusion: 
Incentives, 
Imagination,  
and Innovation
The McCullough biography points to any 
number of Wright family traits that led to 
their success. The brothers were exhaustive 
researchers and the kind of tireless workers 
frequently branded—and sometimes de-
rided—as “grinders.” But the Wright broth-
ers were also visionaries on the grandest 
scale, reshaping the art of the possible by 
painstaking trial and error and meticulous 
observation, record keeping, and attention 
to detail. The brothers excelled at efficiently 
and effectively identifying, isolating, and 
then pragmatically solving problems. Their 
success depended upon quiet self-confi-
dence and their unwavering resolve. 
Readers may draw innumerable lessons 
from these examples. Although the quest 
for models and case studies—much like the 
pursuit of innovation—is endless, commenc-
ing the journey is the first critical step. CM
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